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Constitutional Law-SEARCHES AND SEIZUREs-ExcLUSIONARY
RULE INAPPLICABLE TO FEDERAL CIVIL TAX PROCEEDING WHERE
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED IN STATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGA



TION-United States

v.

Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).

I n November 1968 Los Angeles police seized wagering records
and $4,940 from Max Janis in reliance on a search warrant. One
of the police officers informed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
of the arrest and seizure and subsequently assisted an IRS agent
in a n alyzing the seized wagering records. Using a calculation
based upon these records, the IRS assessed Janis $89,026.09 in
wagering excise taxes and levied on the seized $4,940 in partial
satisfaction.
In a state criminal proceeding for violation of loc al gambling
laws, the warrant was declared invalid and the seized records
were held inadmissible.• Janis subsequently brought an action in
federal district court for refund of the $4,940 and to have the
deficiency assessment quashed. The ffiS counterclaimed for the
unpaid balance of the assessment.
Concluding that the assessment was based substantially on
evide nce obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, the dis
trict court held that the assessment was invalid and that Janis
was e ntitled to a refund. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.2 The Supreme Court reversed, hold
ing that the "exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid
the u se in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized
by a crimin al law enforcement agent of another sovereign."3
I.

BACKGROUND

The exclu sionary rule of evidence was adopted by the Su
preme Court as a means of enforcing fourth amendment guaran
te es against unreasonable searches and seizures} Since the 1961
l. The state court found that the affidavit supporting the warrant "did not set forth,
.
•n sufficient detail, the underlying circumstances to enable the issuing magistrate to
de term ine indepe
ndently the reliability of the information supplied by the informants."
United State s v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 437-38 (1976). This standard was articulated by the
upreme Court in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), after the search warrant
in the instant case had been issued, 428 U.S. at 437.
2. Unpublished memorandum without opinion. 428 U.S. at 439.

�

3. Id. at 459-60.
4. In Weeks v. United States, 232

U S 383 (1914), which made the exclusionary rule
b indin g on the federal courts, the Supreme Court said:
.

.

The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United
States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under
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decision of Mapp v. Ohio, 5 evidence r esulting from an unconstitu

tional search and seizure has been inadmissible in state, as well
as federal, criminal proceedings. The effect of the exclus onary

�

rule in civil proceedings, however, has not been clear.' This s��

tion will examine the applicability of the exclusionary rule to c1v1l
cases in general and to civil tax cases in particular. 7
A.

The Supreme Court and Civil Applicability of the
Exclusionary Rule

The Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary rule
to exclude illegally seized evidence from true civil proceedings.8
Its decisions have indicated ambivalence, however, as some have
suggested the rule's potential applicability in noncriminal cases
while others have indicated hostility toward the prospect of ex
tending the rule into the civil arena.
It is well established that the exclusionary rule is applicable
in quasi-criminal proceedings-proceedings that are technic ally
civil but actually penal in nature.9 In the 1886 case of Boyd v.
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and
to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against
all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law . ... The tendency
of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions ... should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution ....
Id. at 391-92.
For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the exclusionary rule, see
Geller. Enforcing The Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. CHt. L. REv. 665 (1970).
5. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. E.g Cleary v. Bolger, 371U.S.392, 403 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); 43 DEN.
L.J. 511 (1966); 55 VA. L. REv. 1484 (1969); 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1583 (1973). While some
..

courts and commentators have perceived the Supreme Court as moving toward applica·
tion of the exclusionary rule in civil cases, the Court has never explicitly decided the
�uestion. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792, 802 (1972); note 21 and accompanying te xt
infra.

7. For a collection of civil cases in which the exclusionary rule is at issue, see Annot.,

5 A.L.R.3d 670 (1966).

8.United States v. Janis, 428U.S.433, 447 (1976).
9. This term h a s been defined as follows:
Laws that provide for punishment but are civil rather than criminal in form
have sometimes been labeled "quasi-criminal" by the Supreme Court. These
laws, broad! � �pea king, ?�ovide for �ivil money penalties, forfeitures of p roperty,
.
and the punitive 1mpos1tion of various disabilities, such as the loss of profes
sional license or public employment.
Clark, <'it•i/ and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Const itution al
.
Analysis. 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 381 (1976)(footnotes omitted).

211]

CASE NOTES

213

United States, 10 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a fed
eral revenue statute requiring the defendant in a forfeiture pro
ceeding to produce d ocuments requested by the government or t o
have a refusal to d o s o taken as evidence o f guilt. The Court found
that forfeiture proceedings, "though they may be civil in form,
are in their nature criminal. "11 Given the quasi-criminal nature
of the action, the Court held the compulsory production of private
papers equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure and held
the statute unconstitutional under the fourth and fifth amend
ments. In the more recent case of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 12 state officials brought a forfeiture action against
an automobile seized after an illegal search had revealed liquor
n ot bearing appropriate tax seals. Recalling the Boyd precedent,
the Supreme Court reasoned that since forfeiture represented a
penalty for the criminal offense, it would be anomalous to exclude
evidence from a criminal proceeding but not from a forfeiture
proceeding that required a determination that the law had been
viola ted.13
Several Suprem e Court opinions in criminal cases suggest
that the exclusionary rule is not limited to the criminal or quasi
c rim inal areas. For example, in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 14 a case extending fourth amendment protections
to c orporat ions accused of criminal activity, the Court said: "The
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. "15 In
Weeks v. United States, 16 the Court stated that fourth amend
ment protection "reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or
not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon
all entr usted under our Federal system with the enforcement of
the laws."11
The tandem decisions of Camara v. Municipal Court18 and
See v. City of Seattle18 carried fourth amendment protections into
10. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
11. Id. at 634.
12. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
13. Id. at 701.
14 . 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
1 5. Id. at 392.
16. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17 . Id. at 392.
18. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
19 . 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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the area of administrative searches and seizures. The petitioners
in both cases had been convicted of state criminal charges for
refusing to permit warrantless administrative inspections. The
Supreme Court reasoned in Camara that "[i]t is surely anoma
lous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the fourth amendment o nly when the individual s
suspected of criminal behavior."20 Some commentators saw th is

�

development as presaging the extension of the exclusionary rule
to civil proceedings. 21
Although the above cases suggest an expansion o f the exclu
sionary rule into civil actions, other recent decisions of the Court,
by focusing on the theoretical justifications for the rule, have
limited its scope.22 Three dominant justifications for the rule have
been recognized by the courts. The first, judicial integrity,23 is
concerned with protecting the integrity of the judicial process by
declining to admit evidence tainted by illegal searches and sei
zures. The second justification stresses the individual rights vio
lated in an illegal search and seizure.24 It provides that any justifi
cation for admitting the evidence is less weighty than the public
policy condemning the violation of fourth amendment rights. The
third major justification for the rule is that it deters u nlawful
police conduct25-knowledge that the fruits of illegal searches and
seizures will be inadmissible at trial tends to deter law enforce
ment officers from violating fourth amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has increasingly emphasized the deter
ren �e rationale in its opinions limiting the scope of the rule. In
United States v. Calandra,28 for example, the Court declined to
extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. Defining
20. 387 U.S. at 530 (footnote omitted).
21. E.g . Clark, supra note 9, at 416; Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy:
Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314, 1345 (1967).
.

22. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (rule of Almeida-Sanchez not
app l ied retros ctively); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974) (language sug·
�
it�tmg ex�lusionary rule should not be applied when unconstitutional conduct s in good
i
faith); ll 1ted States v. Cala dra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule not applicable
�
�
.
to grand Jury proceedm
�s); B1�ens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27
( 1971 l (Burger, C .J . . dissenting) (excoriates the exclusionary rule); Desist v. United
_

�

States 394 lf S 24 . 246, �53 (1969) (Katz not applied retr ospectively; language su gges ts
'.
exclusiona
ry rule inapplicable where deterre n t purpose is not served); Linkletter v.
.

.

Walker, �RI U.S. 618, 636-39 (1965) (Mapp not applied retrospectively).
23. See Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present No Future,
'
12 AM. CRIM. L. RF.v. 507, 510-11 (1975).
:l4. Id. at ri<l8-10.
2f>. Id.

11t

!111-17.

26. 414 U.S. 3:18 (1974).
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the purpose of the rule in terms of deterring unconstitutional
police conduct, the Court reasoned that any "incremental deter
rent effect" that might accrue by extending the rule would not
outweigh the costs of its imposition. 'l7
One factor that the Court has considered important in weigh
ing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is the presence or
absence of good faith in the law enforcement officers conducting
the illegal search and seizure. The presence of good faith in a
8

particular situation reduces the deterrent effect of the rule. 2
The recent tendency of the Court to limit the scope of the
exclusionary rule by focusing on the deterrence rationale calls
into question the forecasts of its extension made subsequent to
Camara and See. 29 In view of the Supreme Court's apparent am
bivalence, it is not surprising that lower courts directly confront
ing the issue have reached mixed results. For analytical purposes,
these lower court cases may be conveniently classified according
to the party conducting the illegal search and seizure and the
party seeking to use illegally seized evidence in the subsequent
civil action.

B.
1.

Lower Courts and Civil Applicability of the Exclusionary
Rule
Seizures by private individuals

a. Private actions. The few cases dealing with the exclu
sio nary rule in the context of private actions involving nongovern
ment al searches and seizures are divided.30 A number of courts
27. See id. at 351. The dissent in Calandra argued that focusing on the deterrence
ratio nale was not only erroneous, but it positioned the Court to "abandon altogether the
exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases." Id. at 365.

28. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975).
29. Note 21 and accompanying text supra.
30. Leading cases excluding evidence obtained in nongovern mental seizures include:
Del Presto v. Del
Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Ch. 1966), rev'd on other
Rrounds, 97 N.J. Super. 446, 235 A.2d 240 (App. Div. 1967) (evidence illegally seized by
s p o u s e inad mis sible in divorce action); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221
.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966) (letters illegally obtained by husband from divorced wife's car
inad missib le in second divorce proceeding).
C ases admitting evidence obtained in nongovernmental seizures include: Young v.
You ng, 21 3 Pa. Super. 515, 247 A.2d 659 (1968) (testimony related to illegal entry by
husba nd and private investigator admissible in divorce action); Seckler v. Sackler, 15
N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964) ( proof of wife's adultery admissible in
div orce action even though obtained by husband in illeital forcible entry into her home);
Walker v. Pen ner, 190 Or. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951) (uncorked whisky bottle llegally
removed from defendant's car by plaintiff's passenger admissible in per8<>nal inJury ac
tion ) .

�

�
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have found the exclusionary rule applicable to private actions
involving nongovernmental seizures. In Del Presto v. Del Presto, 31
for instance, a state court announced that the rule of Mapp v.
Ohio32 was applicable in civil as well as in criminal cases. In
Williams v. Williams, 33 the court reasoned that while constitu
tional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
were meant primarily to protect the citizen from governmental
intrusions, the same protections should be extended to cases in
volving private searches and seizures because no individual
should be granted "greater power than the government itself."34
Courts declining to apply the exclusionary rule in private
actions have generally taken the position that fourth amendment
protections are unavailable when governmental intrusions are not
involved. In sharp contrast to the Del Presto approach, for exam
ple, the court in Sackler v. Sackler35 failed to exclude evide nce
illegally seized by the husband in a divorce action because it
found the Mapp rule applicable only to government seizures.
Similarly, in Walker v. Penner, 38 the court asserted that the
"constitutional restrictions against unreasonable search and sei
zure are intended as a limitation on the powers of government,
and not a restraint on the unauthorized act of an individual."37
b. Actions in which the government is a party. The cases
involving actions in which the government is a party but where
an illegal search and seizure was carried out by a private indi vid
ual have focused primarily on the degree of governmental partici
pation in the illegality. In Knoll Associates v. FTC, 38 the exclu
sionary rule was applied where an illegal seizure was carried out
by a private individual. In refusing to admit privately seized
documents in the governmental proceeding, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the private individual had stolen the documents for
the purpose of assisting the FrC in a pending action and that the
government had accepted the documents with knowledge of the
illegal seizure.39
31. 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (Ch. 1966), reu'd on other grounds, 97 N.J.
Super. 446, 235 A.2d240 (App. Div. 1967).
32. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221N.E.2d622 (C.P. 1966).
34. Id. at 162, 221 N.E.2dat 626.
35. 15N.Y.2d40, 203N.E.2d481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
36. 190 Or. 542, 227 P.2d316 (1951).
37. Id. at 548, 227 P.2dat 319.
38. 397 F.2d530 (7th Cir. 1968).
39. Id. at 533.
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A different result was reached in NLRB v. South Bay Daily
Breeze. 40 In a proceeding to enforce an order of the National Labor

Relations Board, the Ninth Circuit allowed into evidence a docu
men t illegally taken b y a private individual. In declining to apply
the exclusionary rule, the court noted that, unlike the situation
in Knoll, there was no showing that the purpose of the private
seizure had been to aid the government in its action.41 The court
further observed that fourth amendment protections were gener
ally inapplicable to civil proceedings and that the deterrence ra
tionale for the exclusionary rule was not persuasive when a non
�overnmental seizure was at issue.42 The court found support for
its conclusion in Burdeau v. McDowell, 43 a criminal case in which
the Supreme Court had not applied the exclusionary rule because
the illegal seizure had been conducted by private parties without
governmental participation or implied approbation.

2.

Seizures by gover nment agents

a. Private actions. Some courts have e xcluded evidence in
pri vate actions involving governmental seizures, finding no dis
tin ction between civil and criminal actions in terms of the appli
cability of the exclusionary rule.44 Other courts have admitted
ille g ally seized evid e n c e, however, recognizing a difference in
the applicabi lity of fourth amendment protections to civil and
criminal actions. 45
40. 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
41. Id. at 363.

42. Id. at 363- 64.
43. 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Some cases finding the exclusionary rule applicable to civil
actions involving
nongovernmental searches and seizures have suggested that Burdeau
w as effectively
overrul ed by the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
0960). E.g., Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 307, 223 A.2d 217, 218 (Ch.
1966) , reu'd
on other grounds, 97 N.J. Super. 446, 235 A.2d 240 (App. Div. 1967). The
Su preme Court
in the instant case, however, indicated that Burdeau has retained its
validity. 428
U.S. at 455 n.31.

44. Cases in which the evidence has been excluded include: Lebel v. Swincicki, 354
Mich. 427, 93
N.W.2d 281 (1958) (error to admit evidence indicating intoxication based
on police-dir
ected blood test of unconscious defendant in wrongful death action); Gilbert
v. Leach, 62
Mich. App. 722, 233 N.W.2d 840 (1975) (ex�lusion of blood alcohol t�t
performe d at
police request on defendant in negligence action �here there was question
as to defen d
ant's consent)· Iriza rry v. City of New York, 79 Misc. 2d 346, 357 N.Y.S.2d
in malicious prose
756 (Civ. Ct. 1974)
(eviden e illegall y obtained by police inadmissible
cution suit broug
ht by private citizen).
45. C ases in which evidence has been admitted include: Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
in unauthor
F.2d 340 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421U.S. 1011 (1975) (evid�n�e ob �ain
(
ized sea rch of
11ble in action to recover
i;
adm1s
officials
local
and
state
by
plaintiff's home
on fire insuran
Dtv. 2d 634, 349 N.Y.S.2d
ce policy); Herndon v. City of Ithaca, 43 App.

�

?IO

�
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Governmental actions. The body of case law becomes

b

;

large and somewhat more consistent on the role of the e xclusion
ary rule in government civil actions involving seizures by govern
ment agents. In most cases the rule has been found to app y.45

�

Most of the cases in this class fit the quasi-criminal description.
Tax cases, particularly relevant to the instant case, will also be
treated in this section.
Quasi-criminal cases. Although forfeiture proceedings are
the most numerous of the quasi-criminal class,47 the quasi
criminal rationale has been employed to exclude illegally seized
evidence in a variety of governmental proceedings. 48 While the
majority of the cases that could be classified as quasi-criminal
invoke the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence illegally seized
by government agents, there are some exceptions. Before
Plymouth Sedan, for example, it was not unusual for courts to
decline to apply the exclusionary rule in forfeiture cases.49 Recent
decisions have also refused to apply the rule in arguably quasi
criminal circumstances. In United States v. Fitzpatrick, 5 0 for in
stance, the Second Circuit refused to apply the rule to exclude
illegally seized evidence from a parole revocation proceed i ng. The
court's rationale emphasized that suppression would hamper the
parole system by requiring collateral suppression hearings with
out serving the deterrent purpose of the rule.51 Similar reasoning
was applied in United States v. Schipani, 52 where the court de
clined to apply the exclusionary rule in a sentencing proceeding.53
'l2i ISup. C't. 1973),

appeal dismissed,

35 N.Y.2d 956, 324 N.E.2d 555, 365 N.Y.S.2d 176

( 19i4l (evidence illegally obtained by police admissible in personal injury action).

46. A selection of such cases is included in Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 670 ( 1 966).
-ti . See notes 9-13 and accompanying text supra.
48. E.R . Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (D.C. Mont.), appeal dismissed sub
.

nom .

Jack �n, 267 F. 1022 (9th Cir. 1920) (deportation proceeding); Iowa v. Union
Asphalt & Road01\s, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd sub nom. Stan dard Oil

Andrews

v.

•

.'"· l�wa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) ( a ntitrust
proceeding); People v. Moor e, 69
< nl.'ld fii-t, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968) (civil narcotic commitment proceeding);
\mon v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (proceeding to abate gambling nuis

�0-

nnrel; LR Penta v. New York State Liquor Auth., 30 App. Div. 2d 1033, 2 94 N.Y.S.2d 947
!Sup. C't. 1968), atf'd. 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1969) (liquor
license revocation action).

49. ER. M artin v. United States, 2 7 7 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1960).

:-o. ·126 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970) .
fi\. Id. at 1
The court noted that the exclusionary rule was available in the
.
rnmmnl
proceed mg and that the deterrent purpose of the rule was adequately ser ved by
suppression there.
:.'2. -t:l!l F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).

�64.

;,:1. Id. at :IB: "

�e believe that applying the exclusionary rule for

a second time at

.
srnt!'�rinl(
nfter havmg already applied it once at the trial itself would not add in any
s1ic111hcnnt way to the deterrent effect of the r ule."
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Instead of concerning i tself with the nature of the proceeding, the
court in each case considered the practical effect of imposing the
exclusionary rule, fi nding that the cost outweighed the benefit.

Civil tax cases. Lower court decisions have almost uniformly
applied the exclusionary rule to civil tax procee dings. 54 The cases
typically involve a fourth amendment challenge to a wagering tax
assessment on the ground that it is based on illegally seized evi
dence. The challenge may be raised by way of an action for in
junction or refund55 or simply as part of a defense.58 Some courts
assert that fourth amendment protections are as applicable in
principle to civil cases in which the government has illegally
seized evidence as they are in criminal cases. 57 Another approach
is to view the tax action as essentially quasi-criminal. In United

States v. Blank, 58 for instance, the court reasoned that large civil
assessments and penalties are tantamount to criminal sanctions
54. Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986
0969) (exclusionary rule applied in action to enjoin levy of jeopardy assessment); Ander
son v Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (fruits of unlawful search and seizure
cannot support assessment); Yannicelli v. Nash, 354 F. Supp. 143 (D.N.J. 1973) (dictum
to the effect that assessment is i n v alid when substantially based on illegally seized evi
de� ce; but government may place lien on illegally seized property retained in custody);
United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 ( S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
l968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) ( dictum to the effect that evidence illegally seized
by g ove rnment o
fficials would be excluded from civil action); United States v. Blank, 261
F. Supp. 180 ( N.D
. Ohio 1966) ( exclusion of evidence seized by IRS from deficiency
asse ssment proceedi
ng); United States v. Chase , 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. � 15,733 (D.D.C.
l966) ( assessme nt
based on illegally seized material inadmissible in suit brought by gov
er nme nt); Hinc
hcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963), reu'd on other grounds,
371 F . 2d 697 ( 6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967) ( suppression for criminal or civil
procee dings orde
red for evidence illegally seized by gover nment); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F.
Supp. 684 (D.
Mass. 1963), appeal dismissed, 334 F.2d 742 ( 1s t Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 961
( 1965), aff'd sub nom. McGarry's Inc. v. R ose, 344 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1965)
( g ov ern ment
barred from using illegally seized evidence against taxpayer); Lassoff v.
G�ay, 207 F.
Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962) ( assessment held invalid when based solely on
evide nce illega
lly seized by IRS); Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1948), reu 'd
on ther grou
�
nds, 173 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1949) (dic tum to the effect that assessment would
be inv alid if
based solely on illegally obtained evidence); Hill v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.
8 46 0973) (dic
tum to the effect that evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment
should not be
admitted in assessment proceeding); Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792
0972) ( suppression
of assessmen t evidence illegally seized by police). But cf. Compton v.
Un ited States, 334
F.2d 212 ( 4th Cir. 1964) (presumption of correctness given tax assess
�ent un affec ted by the fact that it was based on unconstitutionally seized evidence;
illegally seized
evidence may be used for impeachment purposes).
5 5. E.g., Pizzarello v United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
986 0969) ( inj
(refund).
unction); C mpton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 ( 4th Cir. 1964)
5 6. E.g., United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
,
57 . E.g., United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 ( S.D. Cal. 1967), aft d, 405 F.2d
738 ( 9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
58. 261 F. Supp. 180 ( N.D. Ohio 1966 ).
·

�
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and that the government should not be able to excuse its violation
of constitutional mandates by choosing a "civil forum."59
Recent civil tax assessment cases, factually similar to the
instant case, have applied the exclusionary rule. In Pi.zzarello v.
United States, 80 the taxpayer brought an action to enjoin a jeop
ardy assessment for unpaid wagering taxes on money illegally
seized by special treasury agents. In a prior criminal action, the
evidence of wagering had been suppressed. Observing that with
out an exclusionary rule the government would be free to conduct
unreasonable searches and seizures in all civil cases without suf
fering unfavorable consequences, the Second Circuit found the
assessment invalid.81 In Suarez u. Commissioner, 82 an illegal
search and seizure had been carried out by state criminal law
enforcement officers. In a criminal action, the illegally seized
records had been suppressed. The police had made copies of these
same records available to the IRS, which brought a civil assess
ment action. The court found support for the application of the
exclusionary rule in language used by the Supreme Court.63 After
reviewing considerations of deterring unconstitutional conduct,
preserving judicial integrity, and safeguarding individual rights,
the court held that "the protective rule of the fourth amendment
which excludes evidence illegally obtained is applicable in a civil
tax case."54 Making explicit what was implicit in the majority
opinion, a concurring opinion said that it was immaterial that
federal agents had not conducted the illegal raid.85 The majority
concluded that the assessment carried no presumption of correct
ness and that if the government were to prevail, it would have to
establish the existence of a deficiency with evidence independent
of that unconstitutionally seized.••
These tax cases arose in the precise legal context in which the
exclusionary rule issue in the instant case appeared. Whenever
courts have dealt directly with the question of the exclusionary
rule's applicability in the civil tax setting, they have found it
applicable.

59. Id. at 182.
60. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969).
61. Id. at 586.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

58 T.C. 792 (1972).
Id. at 802.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 815.
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INSTANT CASE

Janis that
the exclusionary rule does not preclude the use in a civil proceed
ing of one sovereign of evidence illegally seized in a criminal
investigation by agents of another sovereign. 67 In reaching this
conclusion, the majority focused on what it termed the "prime
purpose" of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of "future unlawful
police conduct. "88
A divided Supre m e Court held in United States

v.

Observing that there was no evidence that the rule actually
deters unlawful police conduct, 89 the Court concluded that the
societal costs of excluding the evidence outweighed the benefits
of suppression.70 The Court reasoned alternatively that (1) if the
rule does not deter, its use in the instant situation was clearly
unwarranted; and

(2)

if the rule does deter, its application in

criminal proceedings m ust "be assumed to be a substantial and
efficient deterrent."71 Assuming the efficacy of this deterrent ef
fect in criminal cases, the Court said that further application of
the rule to the civil p r oceeding of a sovereign different from the
one involved in the illegal seizure would have such an attenuated
deterr ent effect that the costs to society would outweigh the bene
fits of exclusion.72
T he majority acknowledged that the exclusionary rule had
b een applied in civil proceedings in other federal courts. It distin
guished those cases from the instant case, however, by pointing
out that most of them involved "intrasovereign" fourth amend

me nt violations "in which the officer committing the unconstitu
tional sear ch or seizure was an agent of the sovereign that sought
to use the evidence."73 The majority admitted that the exclusion

ary rule had been applied in an intersovereign situation in the
Suarez case, but disagreed with the result because the tax court

U.S.

67 . 428
at 459-60.
68. Id. at 446.
69. After discussing the difficulties inherent in any empirical test of the rule, the

Court stated:

The final conclusion is clear. No empirical researc her, proponent or oppo
nent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with a? y � s s.urance wh�ther the
rule has a deterrent effect even in the situations in which 1t 1s now applied.
ing
We are aware of no study on the possible deterrent effect of exclud
·

evidence in a civil proceeding.

Id. at 450 n.22.
70. Id. at 454.
71. Id. at 453-5 4.
72. Id. at 454.
73. Id. at 456.

·

·
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Suarez

had failed to focus on the deterrent purpose of the
in
exclusionary rule and because it had failed to distinguish between
intersovereign and intrasovereign uses of unconstitutionally
seized evidence.74
The majority also introduced a new formulation o f the judi
cial integrity rationale.75 It indicated that the inquiry into
whether judicial integrity would be served by the exclusion of
evidence was essentially the same as inquiring whether the exclu
sion of evidence in a particular case would deter police from mak
ing fourth amendment violations. The focus in both inquiries was
on whether the admission of illegally seized evidence would en
courage violation of fourth amendment rights. The Court held
that considerations of judicial integrity therefore did not require
exclusion in this case.78
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, em
phasized individual rights instead of societal costs. He argued
that the exclusionary rule is a n inherent constitutional ingredient
of fourth amendment protections and criticized the majority for
limiting the rule. 77
Justice Stewart, also dissenting, contended that wagering
tax provisions constituted "an adjunct to the enforcement of the
criminal law" and that the majority opinion frustrated the deter
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule by allowing state police to
turn illegally seized evidence over to the IRS on a "silver plat
ter. "7A
III.

ANALYSIS

. Given the proposition that deterrence is the primary justifi
cation for the exclusionary rule, 79 the result reached in
v.
is consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions
hm1tm� the ule' applicabi lity .80 While the opinion presents
�
�
some difficulties, its essential soundness is not unde rmined by
the dissenting contention that local and federal law enforcement
officers
will be free to act in concert to violate fourth amendment
.
nghts."1 The decision is import ant because its rationale is hostile

United

�ta�e� Janis

74. Id. at 456-57.
7f1. Spp note 23 and accompanying text .�upra
76. 428 U.S. at 458 n.35.

·

77. Id. at 460.

78. Id. at 463-64.
79. United States

v.

Calandra, 414

U.S.

338, 347 0974).

RO. Notes 22-28 and accompanying text .mpra.
111. 428 U.S. at 463.
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to the application of the exclusionary rule to many civil litigation
situations, as well as to tax assessment proceedings. It also seems
to effectively eliminate the independent existence of the judicial
integrity justification for the exclusionary rule. The following sec
tion will examine some of the difficulties and implications of the
opinion.

A.
1.

The Difficulties

The quasi-criminal argument for suppression

Justice Stewart contends in dissent that "wagering [tax]
provisions are intended not merely to raise revenue but also to
assist" law enforcement officials in enforcing criminal penalties
for "unlawful wagering activities."82 The contention suggests that
the civil tax assessment proceeding in Janis was essentially quasi
criminal and that therefore the exclusionary rule should apply.
There is precedent for regarding a civil tax assessment pro
ceeding as a quasi-criminal action. In United States u. Blank, 83
the exclusionary rule was applied to exclude illegally seized evi
denc e from a civil tax proceeding. The federal district court in
that case reasoned that if the exclusionary rule were not applica
ble, the government could take the "accused down a civil avenue

�o imp ose its penalties while keeping itself free from the imping

in g re quirement s of reasonableness which the Fourth Amend
ment imposes."84 Blank may be distinguished from the present

case, however, since it clearly involved the imposition of "taxes
and penaltie s. "85
The quasi-criminal analysis of the instant case may never
theless seem reasonable
in light of the large assessment involved.
But the analysis would be persuasive only if the excise tax assess
m ent itself were to be regarded as a penalty. 88 While common
sense mig ht sugg est that tax assessments on wagering operations
do p artake of the nature of penalties, courts have held that the
wag erin g excise
tax is not a penalty but rather a revenue raising
measure."7 The Supreme Court in Lewis v. United States/'· for
82. Id. at 461.
83 . 26 1 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
84. Id. at 182.
85. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
86. See note 9 supra.
.
87. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955); United States v.
345 U.S. 22 (19
Cir. 1966),
53); United States v. D.I. Operating Co., 362 F.2d 305
c:ert. denied, 385
Supp. 272
F.
338
U.S. 1024 (1967); Augusta Golf Ass'n v. United States,
(S. D. Ga. 1971).

�ahnger,

(9th

88. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
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example, said that the wagering tax provision "was a constitu
tional exercise of the taxing power and was not a penalty under
the guise of a tax. "A•
2.

Danger of bad faith searches and seizures

Justice Stewart also argued that the majority opinion will
enable state police to "effectively crack down on gambling law
violators by the simple expedient of violating their constitutional
rights and turning the illegally seized evidence over to Internal
Revenue Service agents on the proverbial 'silver platter.' "90 Par
ticularly in view of his contention that the civil tax action is not
totally unrelated to the criminal law imperatives involved in
bringing illegal wagering operators to justice,91 the possibility of
a "bad faith" raid is not unimaginable. For law enforcement offi
cers frustrated with the intricacies of warrant requirements, the
large civil assessments imposed on wagerers may provide satisfac
tory sanctions.
Justice Stewart's prediction is undermined, however, by the
fact that the Los Angeles police relied in good faith on their
search warrant-they did not knowingly use a defective warrant
in order to seize evidence for the purpose of turning it over to the
IRS.12 While it is true that the Court did not expressly rely on the
89. Id. at 421. If the wagering excise tax had been determined to be a "penal ty under
the guise of a tax," it probably would have been found to constitute an unconstitutional
application of the taxing power.

It should be noted that Lewis was overruled by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968), to the extent that Marchetti found mandatory registration requirements for

wagerers violative of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. Language

in Marchetti, referred to by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Janis, does suggest that

wagering tax provisions are rtlated to criminal law enforcement provisions. While
Marchetti does not invalidate the Lewis notion that the wagering tax provision is not a
penalty, it does tend to put that notion into question. The fact that the Janis majori ty
did not see the case in quasi-criminal terms suggests that the Marchetti dicta does not
have much influence at present.
90. 428 U.S. at 463.

91. Id. at 462·63. The argument that civil tax actions against wagerers are part of a
broad criminal enforcement procedure seems to be substantiated by the facts of the

instant case demonstrating close cooperation between the Jaw enforcement and tax au

thorities. Id. at 436-37.
92. Id. at 458 n.35. The majority never doubted that the purpose of the seizure was
to procure evidence for a state criminal proceeding. The close cooperation between the Jaw
enforcement and tax authorities in the instant case, however, raises the possibility that a
subsidiary purpose may have been to provide the tax authorities with evidence upon whic h
to base an assessment. Given the possibility of such dual purpose seizures, judici al te stin g
for good faith may he a troublesome area in future cases similar to Janis. For a discussion

of some of the difficulties involved in testing for good faith, see Comment, Fourth A mend-
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offic ers' good faith i n sustaining the use of the evid_ence, the
Court's holding is factually distinguishable from a case in which
bad faith is present .
3.

The

balancing formula93

The Court rejected the use of the exclusionary rule because
it found the " likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state
police" insufficient to outweigh the "societal costs imposed by the
exclusion. "94 Yet the Court was not explicit about the nature of
those costs. It referred generally to the costs of proscribing rele
vant evidence and of hampering law enforcement, 95 but it did not
specifically address whether the cost element of the balancing
tes t applied in criminal cases" is equally serviceable in a civil
c ase.
The ulti mate costs to society are obviously not the same in
.
.
civ il
and crim inal proceedings. In criminal cases, the cost of the
exclusion ary rule is that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered
. "117 The cost to society in applying the
e xclusionary rule
in a civil tax assessment proceeding is largely
m on etary'8-the tax
assessment may be invalidated . This cost
doe s not see m to
be particularly high in view of the infrequen t
appli cati ons of the
exclusionary rule in tax proceedings and the
alt ernati ve mean
s of tax assessment available to the IRS.99 If
s ociety values
the conviction of criminals more highly than it does
t e coll ecti on
of taxes, the cost to society of a pplying the exclu
s ion ary rule in
the instant case could be trivial in comparison to

?

men t in the Bala
nce-The Exclusionary Rule After Stone u. Powell, 28 BAYLOR L. RBv.
61 1 0 97 6)
.
3 For a disc
ussion of the balancing formula, its origins, and its application to Janis,
see 9 ·
Com m en t, Four
_
th Amendment in the Balance- The Exclusionary Rule After Stone
u. Pow ell,
28 BAYLOR L. REV. 61 1 ( 1976 ).
94 . 428 U.S . at 454.
95 . Id. at 447.

96. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 ( 1 975); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S . 338 0
974) ; Linkletter v . Walker, 381 U.S. 618 ( 1965) .
97 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 2 1 , 150 N.E. 585, 587 ( 1 926 ) .
.
98 . Th ere may also be a "regulatory cost" involved i n the frustration of the wagering
Prov isi on to
the extent that the tax is seen to have a regulatory effect on wagerers.
Alt houg h the
extent of this cost is u ncertain, it seems clear that the coet to society is ati.11
les..'I t an tha t
involved in having a "criminal go free." Of course, if the ta.1 a�ment 1s
i>erce1ved to co
nstitute a quasi-cri minal sanction, the potential coat to society is arguably
closer to th
at involved in the criminal context. As long as the wagenn1 tax 18 attn 88 a
reven ue rai
sing measure, however, the quasi·criminal approach will not be valid .
.
99. See Suarez v. Commiuioner, 58 T.C . 792, 81 9-20 (1972); Duke, 1:°secu t1on.• for
L.J .
Y.wr
76
ral Hybnd,
A t t ernpt.'I to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedu
I , :ll 0966 ) .

�

·

·
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the cost in a criminal case . The Court's effort to demonstrate the
miniscule deterrent effect application of the exclusionary rule
would have in the present case suggests that the Court is merely
balancing trivialities against e ach other.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the Court's weighing is reason
able. Even if it be admitted that the benefits and c osts weighed
by the Court are trivial by comparison to those at stake in crimi
nal cases, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule may well
exceed the benefits of the inconsequential deterren t effect the
rule would have in the instant case. Thus, the balancing of appar
ent trivialities in the instant case does not cast doubt upon the
Court's m ethod of analysis as much as it reveals the lack of com
pelling reasons to apply the exclusionary rule in this factual con
text.
B.

The Implications of Janis for Civil Proceedings

The Court's statement of the holding does not e xplicitly pro
hibit the exclusionary rule's application to civil pro c eedings gen
erally . 100 Yet the thrust of the opinion substantially limits the
applicability of the exclusionary rule in a variety of civil contexts.
1.

Seizures by private individuals

161 the
Making specific reference to Burdea u v. McDo well,
Cou�t observed that the exclusionary rule is not applic able when
a private party conducts the illegal seizure. 1 02 Although Burdeau
has been termed "an anachronism " 103 and has been viewed as
104
effectively overruled by subsequen Supreme Court decisions,
he Court here gives notice that the case has vitality. This vitality
is probably enough to discredit lower court decisions that have
a �plied the exclusionary rule in proceedings involving private
seizures. 105

t

!

100. See 428 U.S. at 459-60.

101 . 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
.
l 02 428 U.S. at 455 n.31. The Court also referred to nited States v. Stonehill, 274
U
F Su pp . 42o ( S. D . Cal. 1967), aff'd, 405 F 2 7
. d 38 (9th c·1r. 1968) , cert . deni·ed, 395 U . S .
·
.
.
.
.
960 ( 1 969 ) , to note the mapphcabihty of the
vern ment
exclusionary rule when a foreign go
comm1'ts the 1.11egal search and seizure.
0_ 1 °3 · Note , The Fourth A mendme
nt Right of Priuacy .· Mapping the Fu ture
iv.V. 1 3 14, 1359 ( 1967).

' 53 VA . L.

104. Note 43 supra.
is �ould he true provided the private
tl 05.
seizure is conducted without govern
men part1c1patlon or approbation See notes
.
38-43 and accompanying text supra.

��
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Seizures by gover nm e n t agents

a. Private ac tio ns. If deterrence is the perceived justifica
tion for applying the exclusionary rule, decisions applying the
rule i n private actions involving governmental searches and sei
zures are of dubious merit-the threatened unavailability of the
ille gally seized evidence t o private litigants would seem to have
no deterrent effect on p ol ice, whose primary interest is govern
ment criminal prosecutions. 1oe The particular analysis of deter
rence i n Janis makes this conclusion more compelling. If the de
terren t effect is too attenuated to justify
the rule's application in
a g overnment action
when agents of another sovereign have con
ducted the illegal search and seizure, then the inapplicability of
the rule in a private civil action follows a fortiori.

b.

A ctions in whic h the government is a party. An issue
�xplicitly left open b y the C ourt is whether the exclusionary rule
is app licable in cases where the law enforcement officers are of
the same sovereign that seeks to use the illegally obtained evi
dence i n a civil proceeding. 107 The unanswered question is itself a
fun cti o n of the
Court's novel effort to distinguish Janis from the
ax c ases in which the rule has been applied. The Court's reason
ing that there is
a difference in deterrent effect between situations
inv olvi n g " int
rasovereign" and "intersoverei gn" fourth amend
8
men t v iolations
permits it to reject the result reached in Suarez, 1 0
where the
exclusionary rule was applied in a federal proceeding
to su p p ress
evidence seized by local law enforcement officers. It
does n ot imp
air decisions l ike pj,zzarello, me however, which in
v olv e a p p
licat ions of the exclusionary rule i n tax proceedings
whe re fe deral
agents conducted the unconstitu tional seizures.
Thus t he decisi
on is rather l imited in one sense-it does not chal
le g e m os
t of the precedents in the civil tax assessment area.
�
Give n t he Cou
rt's appare nt inclination to limit the scope of the
exclusio
nary rule 1 1 0 however it is not inconceiva b le that a future
�iv il ca se involvi g an intra overeign violation could be decided
in much the
same way as this case.
. .
.
c.
Quasi-criminal cases. Even though Janis is a c1v1l case,
the op i n ion's
reasoning raise s the possibility that the exclusionary

�

�

�

.

106. 4 28 U.S.
at 458.
107 . ld. at 455
n.31.
l 08. 58 T. C . 792 (1972). See notes 62-66 and accomp anying text supra.
1 09. 4 08 F .2d 5
969). See notes 60-61 and
7g (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 ( 1
accom p an y
mg text supra.
l 1 0. See
notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra.
·
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rule may not be applicable to all quasi-criminal situations. The
Court implicitly recognized the general legitimacy of the �xclu

sionary rule 's application in quasi-criminal cases by referrmg to
the continued validity of O ne 1958 Ply m o u t h Sedan v .
Pennsylvania. 11 1 But Plymouth Sedan involved an intrasoverei�n
fou rth a m endment violation . 1 1 2 Thus, the ration a l e of Jams,
which finds a difference between intrasovereign and intersover
eign fourth amendment violations, suggests the possibility that
the exclusionary rule might not be applied if a quasi-criminal
action were brought by a sovereign different from the one whose
agents conducted the illegal seizure.
While the above approach is plagued by substantial difficul
ties, 1 13 an a p plication of the Janis rationale to quasi- criminal
cases is conceivable in light of the Supreme Court's rejection in

Calandra of a mechanical application of the exclusionary rule in
favor of a p plication when its deterrence objectives are best
served.11• Deterrence effect could be just as attenuate d in an in
tersovereign quasi-criminal context as in an intersovereign civil
setting. Thus an intersovereign fourth amendment violation in a
quasi-criminal case could provide the Court with an o p portunity
to impose additional limitations on the scope of the exclusionary
rule. • • 5

C.

Deterrence and the Debilitation of the Judicial Integrity
Rationale

On several occasions the Supreme Court has asserted that
the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconsti
tutional conduct by law enforcement officers.1 1s The Court made
l l l . 428 U . S . at 447 n . 17.
1 12. Pennsylvania agents made the initial seizure· the
state brought the subsequent
'
forfeiture action. 380 U.S. 693, 694 (1965) .

1 13. The Court would have to overturn or distinguish the
quasi-crimina l precedents
that have applied the rule. It would also have to contend
with the reality that fourth
amend e t protections are conceptually well establishe
d
r�i �
in
the quasi-criminal sphere
.
where srgmficant penalties against property and liberty
may be assessed .
1 1 4. 414 U . S . 338, 348 ( 1974).
1 15. The Court's distinction betwee n i ntrasov
ereign and intersoverei gn fourth
am ndment viol ati ns co ceivably could be applied
�
in purely criminal cases as well.
�
�
_
Whtie s ch apphcat
ron
mr
ht
follow
logically
from the Court's approach in Janis, in view
� .
�
of the vrtahty of the exclusionary rule in the criminal
context ' it seems doubtful that the
Court would ch
� to so limit the rule's applicabil ity.
1 16. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U . S . 53 1 ,
542 ( 1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 41 7
.
43.1 , 446·47 ( 1 974) ; Umted
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 347.4g ( 1974) ; Desist v.
United States, :194 U.S. 244, 254 n.24 (1969) .

U.�.
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the same assertion in this case . 1 17 But the Court went beyond this
by defining judicial integrity in terms of deterrence:
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context
of evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or en
courage violations of the Constitution . In the Fourth Amend
ment area, however, the evidence is unquestionably accurate,
and the violation is complete by the time the evidence is pre
sented to the court . . . . The focus therefore must be on the
question whether the admission of the evidence encourages vio
lations of Fourth Amendment rights. As the Court has noted in
recent cases, this inquiry is essentially the same as the inquiry
into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. 118

This redefinition of judicial integrity in terms of deterrence
may simply make explicit how the Court has been interpreting
the judicial integrity j ustification for some time . ' 19 The explicit
red efin ition in Janis was clearly foreshadowed in United States
v. Pe l tier : 120 "This approach to the 'imperative of judicial integ
rity ' does not differ markedly from the analysis the Court has
util iz ed in determining whether the deterrence rationale under
girding the exclusionary rule would be furthered by retroactive
app lication of new constitutional doctrines. " 1 2 1 The definition of

j u d icial integrity appearing in Janis, then, does not represent a
dive rge nce from recent opinions; rather it articulates more clearly
how the Court had already been perceiving the judicial int egrity
ra tion ale .
The emaciation of the independent validity of the judicial
1 17. 428 U.S. at 446.
1 18. Id. at 458 n.35.
1 19. It has been observed that judicial integrity as a justification for the exclusionary
rule has been
relegated to a minor role with dubious impact on the outcome of cases. Oaks,
�upra note 4, at 669. In 1973, a commentator suggested that one reason for the relative
im poten cy of the
judicial integrity rationale was that the S upreme Court had implicitly
redefi ned it
in terms of deterrence. The theory behind the redefinition was set forth as
follows :
This im plicit redefinition may well have proceeded on the theory that har
mo ny with the deterrence rationale could be achieved by defending the judicial
integrity rationale in terms of its ultimate goals, rather than in terms of the
responsibility which it places upon the Court to comprehensively protect a

defendant's fourth amendment rights. Harmony is in fact possible under such
a scheme, because the focus of a goal-oriented definition of the judicial integrity
rati onale, like that of the deterrence rationale, is upon public interests.

Com m en t,
Judicia l Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope
of the Excl
usionary Rule, 20 U.C .L.A. L. REv. 1129, 1 1 53 (1 973 ) .
120. 422 U.S. 531 (197 5).
12 1 . Id. at 538.
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integrity rationale was confirmed in Stone v . Pow e ll, 122 which was
decided concurrently with Janis. There, the Court referred to the
"limited role of this justification [judicial integrity] in the deter
mination whether to apply the [exclusionary] rule in a particu
lar context. " 123 The Court repeated that deterrence was the exclu
sionary rule's primary justification. m

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Janis is
basically sound. The quasi-criminal argument for applying the
exclusionary rule is relatively weak in view of the judicial ten
dency to find the wagering excise tax a revenue raising measure
instead of a penalty. The danger of the decision being perceived
as a justification for bad faith searches and seizures seems to be
obviated by the critical fact of good faith on the part of the local
law enforcement agents in this c ase . Despite the Court's cursory
treatment of the cost element of its balancing formula , its analy
sis reveals a lack of compelling reasons to employ the exclusion
ary rule in a civil action involving an intersovereign fourth
amendment violation.
The significance of the decision inheres in its avers ion to
applying the exclusionary rule in several civil contexts : civil ac
tions involving nongovernmenta l illegal searches a n d seizures,
civil actions brought by a sovereign different from the one whose
agents conducted the illegal search and seizure, and, possibly,
�uasi-cr.im nal actions of an intersovereign nature . The decision
�s also s1�mficant for its overt redefinition of the judicial integrity
.
justifi
cation for the exclusiona ry rule. More explicitly than earlier
Su?reme Cour� decisions limiting the role of the judicial integrity
ration�le, Jam� suggests that deterrence is not m erely the pri
.
�ary justification for the rule ; realistically, it is the only justifica
tion .

�

122. 428 U.S . 46 5 ( 1976).
123 . Id. at 485.
124. Id. at 486.

